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ASSESSING THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACT OF
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
IN SERIOUS CRIMINAL TRIALS IN JAPAN
Matthew J. Wilson†
Abstract: In Japan, the idea of citizen involvement in the judicial process has
gained greater acceptance over the past decade. On May 21, 2009, Japan implemented its
saiban’in seido or “lay judge system” as part of monumental legal reforms designed to
encourage civic engagement, enhance transparency, and provide greater access to the
justice system. About eight years before this historic day, a special governmental
committee known as the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) set forth wide-sweeping
recommendations for revamping Japan’s judicial system. The underlying goals targeted
three pillars of fundamental reform, namely: (i) a justice system that is “easier to use, easier
to understand, and more reliable;” (ii) a legal profession “rich both in quality and quantity;”
and (iii) a popular base in which citizens’ trust in the legal system is enhanced through their
participation in legal proceedings. The JSRC viewed the judicial system as an engine
capable of propelling both economic and societal change. It believed that lay judge
participation could function as a piston in this engine by helping shift Japan away from
centralized control and heavy bureaucratic regulation. Lay participation was consistent
with the perceived need for Japanese citizens to not only break away from excessive
dependency on the government, but also to develop greater civic consciousness, become
more actively involved in public affairs, and better integrate community values into the
justice system.
From the outset, the creation and implementation of the lay judge system have been
strongly controlled by the status quo such that direct impact on the outcome of individual
criminal trials has been minimized. However, the value of this monumental court reform
in Japan has been educational, indirect, and real. This Article examines the direct impact
of the lay judge system, describes several of the indirect benefits of the new system, and
then explores the potential of the system going forward. This analysis is done through the
lens of Malcolm Feeley’s 1983 work entitled Court Reform on Trial.
Cite as: Matthew J. Wilson, East Asian Court Reform on Trial: Assessing the Direct and
Indirect Impact of Citizen Participation in Serious Japanese Trials, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J.
75 (2017).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Japan’s recent implementation of monumental legal and court reforms
has significantly impacted the courts, the legal system, individuals, and even
society as a whole. Interestingly, these reforms did not necessarily stem from
a concerted public movement, blaring calls for change, extensive media
pressure, or even foreign influence. According to many, the justice system
was not broken. Rather, major reforms to Japan’s legal and court systems
evolved in response to increasing concerns about a stagnant economy,
†
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mounting debt, and floundering direction. During the 1990s, Japanese
policymakers and business leaders progressively believed that widespread
legal reforms could help spark economic recovery, satisfy evolving needs
associated with globalization, and prepare the nation for the century ahead.
With an eye on infusing energy into the economy through concrete
measures and structural solutions, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi established a
special governmental committee in July 1999 known as the Shiho Seido
Kaikaku Shingikai or the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”). It was
significant that the Prime Minister established the JSRC separately from the
traditional forces of the justice system—the Ministry of Justice, Supreme
Court, and Japan Federation of Bar Associations (“JFBA”).1 Because the
JSRC was answerable directly to the Prime Minister, its mission extended
well beyond the charge of a conventional committee and its sweeping
recommendations would be widely regarded and accepted by the government.
One major judicial reform arising from the JSRC’s deliberations
involved the incorporation of citizens into Japan’s criminal justice system
through the establishment of saiban’in2 (often translated as “lay judge,” “lay
assessor,” or “citizen judge”) trials in certain cases. In Japan’s modern era,
professional judges had almost exclusively handled the reins of the justice
system. Tribunals consisting of one or three professional judges conducted
criminal trials, civil proceedings, and all appeals in Japan. Public
participation in criminal or civil trials as a lay judge or juror was a foreign
concept.
This new foray by Japan into the world of lay participation in trials
constitutes one of the most fascinating modern experiments in court reform.
Before this major court reform, Japan was the lone member of the Group of
Eight nations without a system requiring citizen participation in the trial
process.3 Albeit largely misguided, jury trials in the United States and United
1

Caleb Jon F. Vandenbos, Patching Old Wineskins: Heightened Deference Towards Saiban’in
Findings of Fact on Koso Appeal Is Not Enough, 24 WASH. INT’L L.J. 391, 397 (2015). See also Setsuo
Miyazawa, Successes, Failures, and Remaining Issues of the Justice System Reform in Japan: An
Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 313, 314 (2013).
2
Translated literally, the word saiban’in (裁判員) means “trial member.” It refers to a citizen
participant serving on a mixed panel of professional judges and citizen judges in the quasi-jury system
described in this Article.
3
Matthew J. Wilson, Japan’s New Criminal Jury Trial System: In Need of More Transparency, More
Access, and More Time, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 487, 513–14 (2010) [hereinafter Wilson. Japan’s New
Criminal Jury Trial System] (citing Lay Judge System Starts in Japan amid Lingering Concerns, Thai Press
Reps., May 25, 2009, 2009 WLNR 9772569).
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Kingdom had increasingly come under greater scrutiny and sharper criticism
in recent decades.4 However, court reformers in Japan, Asia, and other parts
of the world have conversely gravitated toward citizen participation in the trial
process.5
At least among reformers and policymakers in Japan (and subsequently
other East Asian countries), there has been sufficient support to enable citizen
participation into the criminal justice process to facilitate greater public
engagement and achieve more transparency. This phenomenon has been seen
in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and even China.
By way of background, the Diet of Japan adopted a proposal to establish
mixed or quasi-jury trials pursuant to the saiban’in ho or Act Concerning
Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials (the “Lay Judge Act”) on
May 21, 2004.6 Based on the JSRC’s recommendations, this transformational
legislation enabled the creation of saiban’in trials to adjudicate certain serious
criminal cases. Pursuant to this Act, the Japanese courts would now select
citizens to assist in adjudicating cases involving homicide, robbery resulting
in bodily injury or death, bodily injury resulting in death, unsafe driving
resulting in death, arson of an inhabited building, kidnapping for ransom,
abandonment of parental responsibilities resulting in the death of a child, and
other serious cases involving rape, drugs, and counterfeiting. 7
Stakeholders impacted by this experiment with citizen participation in
serious criminal cases approached the new saiban’in system and its objectives
with reactions ranging from excitement to opposition.8 Optimists saw the new
system as a vehicle for fostering positive societal change, enhancing
democratic engagement, and bringing transparency to Japan’s sheltered
criminal justice system. Conversely, others strongly believed that the court
system was never broken, and should not be touched by common citizens who
are inexperienced and generally uneducated in the complexities of the law.9

4

Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331, 1349–50 (2012).
MATTHEW J. WILSON, HIROSHI FUKURAI & TAKASHI MARUTA, CIVIL JURY TRIALS IN JAPAN:
CONVERGENCE OF FORCES 112–33 (2015); Nancy S. Marder & Valerie P. Hans, Introduction to Juries and
Lay Participation: American Perspectives and Global Trends, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 789, 820–21 (2015).
6
Saiban’in no Sanka Suru Keiji Saiban ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act Concerning Participation of Lay
Assessors in Criminal Trials], Law No. 63 of 2004 (Japan), translated in Japanese Law Translation,
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [hereinafter Lay Judge Act].
7
Id. art. 2.
8
WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 28–37.
9
Id.
5
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After five years of preparation, saiban’in trials or “lay judge trials”
officially commenced in 2009. Here, Japanese voters are enlisted to serve on
a mixed tribunal consisting of professional judges and lay judges to adjudicate
a criminal case.
Because Japan invested extraordinary amounts of time, energy, and
financial resources in preparing for citizen participation in the new lay judge
system, the first trial met with enormous anticipation. This translated into
much excitement and fanfare for the first lay judge trial. Traditional and nontraditional media coverage were at an unparalleled level. 10 Obtaining a seat
in the courtroom was nearly impossible. 11 Japan’s efforts and energy in
rolling out the system were nothing short of remarkable.
Nearly a decade removed from the first trial, it is instructive to analyze
the success of the system to date and its prospects going forward. To date,
many works (including my own) have evaluated the lay judge system from
various perspectives. Unlike other articles, however, this work assesses the
saiban’in system through the theoretical lens set forth in Professor Malcolm
Feeley’s acclaimed book Court Reform on Trial.12
In his groundbreaking work penned in 1983, Professor Malcolm Feeley
examines the process of innovation and planned change with a focus on
several criminal court reforms across the United States during that period.13
He sets forth a formula for assessing the likely success of criminal court
reforms. Also, he identifies potential pitfalls and stumbling blocks along the
way to successful court reform, and explains why court reform may not
succeed. Although Feeley focuses on the United States, his formula can be
applied to Japan’s experience with lay participation in its criminal justice
system.
Noting that each stage in the change process of a court system has its
own distinct challenges and hazards, Professor Feeley advocates that each
stage of innovative change should be considered separately to best analyze the
prospects of successful court reform. Feeley defines the “stages of
innovation” as i) diagnosis; ii) initiation; iii) implementation; iv)
10

Id. at 40–41.
See Makoto Ibusuki, Quo Vadis? First Year Inspection to Japanese Mixed Jury Trial, 12 ASIANPAC. L. & POL’Y J., 29–31 (2010).
12
MALCOM FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (1983).
13
Id. at 35.
11
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routinization; and v) evaluation.14 By separately analyzing these phases in
the context of one of the major recent changes to the Japanese criminal justice
system, one can more realistically predict the chances of success.
In evaluating the success of any court reform, Feeley postulates that
success in the United States is much more likely when i) there are highly
trained professionals performing complex tasks; ii) authority is diffused and
flexible rather than centralized; iii) duties are ambiguous rather than formally
codified; and iv) roles and mobility are flexible rather than rigidly stratified.
Conversely, he perceives that two primary factors have the potential of
discouraging innovation.15 Specifically, the higher the volume of production,
the greater the need for established routine and the lower the incentive to
change. Further, the greater that the change emphasizes efficiency, the likelier
the program change will be discouraged. 16
This Article dives into the saiban’in system in the context of Feeley’s
formula and general observations. Because this lay judge system is new and
unique, its progress to date and future prospects are ripe for continued analysis
and study.17 Before diving into each element associated with reform and
innovation, it is helpful to establish a foundation for discussion by describing
the modern history of the Japanese justice system and characteristics of court
reform.
II.

FOUNDATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

Through a remarkable recovery from the devastation sustained during
the Second World War, Japan rose to a position of prominence and respect
across the world. The country’s post-war development plan, featuring
market-friendly policies, balanced budgets, and market liberalization, ignited
rapid economic growth that seemed limitless for decades.18 Between 1955
and 1973, Japan experienced average growth of up to nine percent per year.19
As stated by Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda in 1964, Japan’s “vital challenge .
14

Id.
Id. at 38.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 35.
18
Kazumi Funahashi, Japan’s Post-WWII Recovery Can be a Lesson for the World, DAILY SIGNAL,
Nov. 19, 2012, http://dailysignal.com/2012/11/19/japans-post-wwii-recovery-can-be-a-lesson-for-theworld/.
19
See Wataru Takahashi & Shuji Kobayakawa, Globalization: Role of Institution Building in the
Japanese Financial Sector, 11 fig. 1 (Bank of Japan, Working Paper No. 03-E-7 2003),
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/wps_rev/wps_2003/data/wp03e07.pdf.
15
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. . whether domestically or internationally, is to promote stable economic
growth and reduce the disparity between the rich and poor.”20 Four years
later, Japan had become the second largest economy in the world after the
United States.21
Over time, Japan progressively became renowned for its efficiency,
quality, and stability. Now one of the most advanced societies in the world,
Japan provides its citizens with a high overall quality of life. Among other
things, the country has excelled in its per capita income, technological
advancement, convenience, safety, cleanliness, literacy, and life expectancy. 22
Japan’s “economic miracle” stands as a model for emerging nations and
economies recovering from difficult circumstances.23
From a political and legal standpoint, Japan became the most
democratic country in East Asia in the post-war era. Immediately after Japan
announced its decision to surrender to the United States in 1945, General
Douglas MacArthur accepted an appointment as Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (“SCAP”) to oversee the occupation of Japan. Shortly
thereafter, he declared, “To the Pacific basin has come the vista of a new
emancipated world. Today, freedom is on the offensive, democracy is on the
march.”24
In effectuating change to the government and legal systems, General
MacArthur believed that changes should be based on familiar institutions and
continuity, at least to the extent possible. Thus, in order to facilitate the
stabilization and recovery of Japan, SCAP employed as much of the existing
Japanese governmental structure as possible.25 Naturally, the Allied
Occupation involved significant changes designed to facilitate a full-scale
democratic government.26 Without question, the American influence on the
Japanese judicial and legal systems was significant.27 The influence included
the adoption of a new constitution primarily drafted by American lawyers,
new laws modeled after U.S. counterparts, strengthening of the judiciary, and
20

Kuzami Funahashi, supra note 18.
FEELEY, supra note 12, at 36.
22
WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 5.
23
Id.
24
Gen. Douglas MacArthur, VJ Day Broadcast (Sept. 2, 1945), in GENERAL MACARTHUR: SPEECHES
AND REPORTS 1908–1964, at 136–38 (Edward T. Imparato ed., 2000).
25
See Renata Lawson Mack, Reestablishing Jury Trials in Japan: Foundational Lesson from the
Russian Experience, 2 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 101, 130–31 (2012).
26
Elliott J. Hahn, Overview of the Japanese Legal System, 5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 517, 522 (1983).
27
Id.
21
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a guaranteed parliamentary system of government.28 The Constitution
outlined a governmental structure based on the Western concept of separation
of powers that provides for check and balances among the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government.29 The Japanese judiciary
system resembles the structure of United States court systems, with trial
courts, appellate courts, and a supreme court.30
Japan was not an absolute stranger to democratic institutions and
tendencies before the Second World War. In fact, after the restoration of the
Emperor Meiji to the Japanese throne in 1868, Japan embarked on a mission
to “modernize” its political institutions based on Western examples.31
Significant steps taken during the Meiji Restoration period include the
adoption of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan in 1889, the creation of a
national legislature known as the Imperial Diet in 1890, and the
implementation of statutory codes based on Western European models.32
Political parties also emerged during this period, challenging the established
Japanese political order.33 Lawyers and formal legal education did not exist—
at least in the forms known in the West—until the Meiji Era.34 During that
era, with the adoption of a new Western-based system, lawyers quickly came
on the scene.35 As the legal system evolved, Japan experimented with citizen
participation and jury trials for a short period between 1928 and 1943 pursuant
to the pre-war Jury Act.36 The terms of the Japanese surrender in World War
II promulgated in the Potsdam Declaration reflect the existence of these
institutions as it refers to the removal of obstacles to “the revival and
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.”37
During Japan’s post-war transformation, government and public
officials benefitted from an increasing public trust that resulted from the
country’s overall success. This extended to the judiciary given that Japanese
judges were generally regarded as intelligent, honest, politically independent,
28

Murai Ryōta, The Rise and Fall of Taishō Democracy: Party Politics in Early-Twentieth Century
Japan, NIPPON COMM. FOUND. (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a03302/.
29
Court
System
of
Japan,
SUPREME
COURT
OF
JAPAN,
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judicial_sys/Court_System_of_Japan/index.html (last visited July 2, 2017).
30
Id.
31
Murai Ryōta, supra note 28; see also Hahn, supra note 26, at 521.
32
Murai Ryōta, supra note 28.
33
Id.
34
Hahn, supra note 26, at 518.
35
Id. at 521.
36
WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 14–15.
37
Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (Potsdam Declaration) (July 26, 1945).
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and professionally competent.38 In short, the Japanese judiciary comprised a
“small, largely self-regulating cadre of elite legal professionals who enjoy
with reason an extraordinarily high level of public trust.”39
III.

PROCESS OF PLANNED CHANGE—DIAGNOSIS AND CONCEPTION PHASES

Despite the country’s impressive recovery and substantial
achievements in the post-war era, Japan’s economic momentum deteriorated
considerably shortly before the turn of the twenty-first century due to a
prolonged period of economic uncertainty, a swelling national debt, and
political stagnation.40 In the 1980s, Japan’s economy experienced a rapid
escalation in real estate and stock prices. Japan’s Nikkei average eventually
hit its all-time high in 1989. Japan’s economy collapsed shortly thereafter in
spectacular fashion as asset values plummeted, economic growth stalled,
banking problems ensued, and Japan’s Nikkei stock average crashed.41 The
economy had over-expanded during years of exorbitant growth. As a result,
the stock market dropped more than sixty percent and real estate values
plummeted by nearly eighty percent in some cases.42 This phenomenon came
to be known as Japan’s “bubble economy.”43
Unable to immediately return to continuously sustained growth after
the economic bubble popped, the country’s confidence was shaken.
Moreover, Japan’s dominance in manufacturing and innovation was
challenged by other Asian nations that were able to produce goods at much
lower costs.44 The subsequent economic stagnation in Japan in the post-1989
era came to be known as the “Lost Decade.”45 During this time, Japan began
to work to address its problems and challenges.

38
John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in
LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007).
39
Id.
40
WILSON ET. AL, supra note 5, at 5.
41
Id.
42
Brink Lindsey & Aaron Lukas, Revisiting the “Revisionists”: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese
Economic Model, CATO INST. (July 31, 1998), https://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policyanalysis/revisiting-revisionists-rise-fall-japanese-economic-model.
43
MAURICE OBSTFELD, TIMES OF TROUBLES: THE YEN AND J APAN’S ECONOMY 1985–2008, at 1
(Koichi Hamada, et al. eds., 2011).
44
Dan Rosen, Japan’s Law School System: The Sorrow and the Pity, 66 J. LEGAL ED. 267, 271 (2017).
45
Eric Johnston, Lessons from When the Bubble Burst, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/01/06/reference/lessons-from-when-the-bubbleburst/#.WgVFrIZrzdQ.
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Genesis for Court and Legal Reforms

Professor Feeley characterizes the first stage of court reform as
diagnosis. “Diagnosis is the process of identifying problems and considering
solutions.”46 Diagnosis provides a foundation for applying the Feeley formula
to analyze the potential success of a court reform. Recounting the historical
events underlying the movement for a specific legal and court reform can help
in understanding the genesis for the reforms and likelihood of success.
In the case of Japan, the diagnosis related primarily to sustained
economic malaise as opposed to glaring problems with the criminal court
system or popular agitation. Japan’s criminal justice system had been
generally praised by many for its stability, efficiency, and leniency. 47
Japanese society was comparatively safe and largely devoid of major criminal
activity.48 Notwithstanding, the praise does not mean that Japan’s criminal
justice system was perfect, or even that it lacked the need to change in the
eyes of reformers. In fact, some critics and reform-minded individuals had
long sought constructive change to the criminal justice system. 49 More than
anything though, reformers and policymakers set out to find economic and
societal solutions that would propel society forward. 50 In the eyes of
reformers, the country was carrying “enormous financial deficits and
economic difficulties or a sense of some kind of social blockade.”51 This
needed to be remedied, and legal reform was seen as a potential catalyst for
change.
Starting in the 1990s, after the economic “bubble” popped and
appreciable economic growth did not appear imminent, Japanese
policymakers and others diagnosed the source of its economic problems and
considered possible solutions to spur economic growth. 52 Although the
official unemployment rate remained low, the Japanese economy appeared to

46

FEELEY, supra note 12, at 35–36.
Dan Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317, 317–
18 (1992).
48
As Crime Dries up, Japan’s Police Hunt for Things to Do, ECONOMIST, May 18, 2017,
https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21722216-there-was-just-one-fatal-shooting-whole-2015-crimedries-up-japans-police-hunt.
49
WILSON ET. AL, supra note 5, at 36–37.
50
Id. at 12–13.
51
JUD. REFORM COUNCIL, THE POINTS AT ISSUE IN THE JUDICIAL REFORM II.2 (Dec. 21, 1999),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/0620reform.html [hereinafter THE POINTS AT ISSUE].
52
WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 6–7.
47
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be running out of miracles.53 It would grow a little, stop, and then contract a
little.54 To stimulate its economy, Japan slashed interest rates and invested
massive sums on infrastructure and other public works. 55 These attempts to
lift Japan out of the lingering economic doldrums failed to gain the sustained
traction desired by policymakers.56
Calls for deregulation and administrative reform to combat the
economic slowdown grew progressively louder.57
Previously, the
government had endeavored to prevent excessive competition and corporate
failure by heavily controlling market entry. 58 This approach was now
backfiring, while global competitive forces were putting pressure on Japan’s
dominance. 59 Domestically, a response to the massive number of nonperforming loans and high bankruptcy rates was necessary.60 Unlike the past
several decades, many felt that Japan could no longer rely heavily upon
concentrated bureaucratic oversight and regular governmental intervention to
achieve economic solutions.61 Instead, government bureaucrats were
criticized for practicing a “unique form of state-directed insider capitalism”
pursuant to which the government favored certain industries, controlled the
allocation of capital, regardless of market signals, and helped prop up real
estate and stock values.62 Unlike the praise that observers had offered when
the Japanese economy was firing on all cylinders, bureaucratic interference
and control quickly became broadly criticized.63
B.

Conceiving Solutions from a Legal Perspective

The diagnosis stage outlined by Professor Feeley starts with
identification of the problem and progresses to the exploration of potential
solutions.64 Understanding that the country needed to address its enormous
financial deficits, lingering economic difficulties, and challenging social
issues, Japanese policymakers felt compelled to explore solutions from
53
Jim Impoco, Life after the Bubble: How Japan Lost a Decade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/weekinreview/19impoco.html.
54
Id.
55
Lindsey & Lukas, supra note 42.
56
Impoco, supra note 53.
57
WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7.
58
Id. at 6.
59
Id. at 7.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Lindsey & Lukas, supra note 42.
63
Id.
64
FEELEY, supra note 12, at 36.
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diverse perspectives.65 The deregulation conversation initially focused on
economic issue, but subsequently morphed into a deeper discussion, not only
about scaling back governmental intervention in the private sector, but also
about reevaluating Japan’s economic, administrative, political, and legal
structures.66
The judicial system was seen as “a social infrastructure indispensable
for national life,” particularly in terms of its role to “support the free and fair
activities of people by making rules and providing resolution of disputes.”67
Thus, the observation that “economic circumstances are drastically and
rapidly changing” in Japan led the government to conclude that the judicial
system as then-constituted was incapable of adequately supporting economic
activities.68 To enable the Japanese economy to stabilize and grow in the
twenty-first century, the judicial system required drastic reform.69 Although
talks of judicial reform initially focused on the civil justice system, these
rapidly spread to a comprehensive analysis of both the civil and criminal
justice systems.70
In essence, reformers rationalized that Japan should expand the role of
law to stimulate the economy and enhance participatory democracy. 71 The
justice system would benefit from greater access, user-friendliness, and
increased citizen involvement and understanding. 72 Reformers believed
greater citizen involvement could help improve governmental transparency,
increase public and private accountability, and inspire the private sector.73
Through legal reform, the hope was that society would strengthen, the
economy would grow, and the country could adequately prepare for domestic
challenges.74 Becoming more responsive to complex and dynamic matters
65

THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, II.2.
Id.
67
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE, AND INDUSTRY OF J APAN, REPORT OF CORPORATE LEGAL SYSTEM
STUDY GROUP FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND THE J UDICIAL SYSTEM (May 9, 2000),
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gCorpMaine.html [hereinafter METI REPORT].
68
Id. (noting that “enterprises involved in economic activities are required to dynamically and rapidly
cope with such change in such areas as the (i) implementation of corporate alliances, etc. for the purpose of
revitalization of competitiveness in the international market, (ii) intensifying the corporate governance
system, and (iii) modification of business models in response to globalization. . . .”).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, I.1.
72
See generally METI REPORT, supra note 67.
73
THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, III.1.
74
Id. I.1.
66
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was also key.75 From a global perspective, reforms to the legal system could
position Japan for an even greater role in the global community and enable it
to respond to global issues more quickly and efficiently. 76 Legal reform was
increasingly viewed as a pathway to recovery. 77 Accordingly, policymakers
started paying attention to reforming laws, policies, legal institutions, and the
courts.
In time, Japan’s dominant political party, the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), together with big business, adopted the notion that the “rule of law”
should displace the concept of “rule by law.”78 These groups agreed that the
arsenal of solutions needed to be expanded beyond a deregulatory approach
aimed only at economic revitalization. 79 It also needed to include social,
political, and legal reforms.80 An expanded arsenal of solutions was crucial
in getting a larger package of judicial reforms, including the new saiban’in
system, passed into legislation. 81 The saiban’in system was consistent with
the spirit of deregulation and empowerment of the individual given that the
new system limits government involvement in criminal trials by shifting some
of the legal responsibility to ordinary citizens.82
PROCESS OF PLANNED CHANGE—INITIATION PHASE

IV.

With some of its problem seemingly diagnosed and potential solutions
under consideration, Japan moved into the second phase of planned change
with respect to its court system—initiation—as defined in Professor Feeley’s
book. During initiation, “new functions are added or practices are
significantly altered,” and, as observed in Japan, policymakers must decide
which alternatives will be adopted, how programs will be financed, and who
will oversee the changes.83

75

See generally METI REPORT, supra note 67.
THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, II.3.
77
Id. II.2.
78
METI REPORT, supra note 67.
79
THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, II.1.
80
Zachary Corey & Valerie P. Hans, Japan’s New Lay Judge System: Deliberative Democracy in
Action?, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 72, 90 (2010).
81
ANNA DOBROVOLSKAIA, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JURY SERVICE IN JAPAN: A SQUARE BLOCK IN A
ROUND HOLE? 209 (2016).
82
Corey & Hans, supra note 80, at 90 (citing Dan W. Puchniak, Perverse Main Bank Rescue in the
Lost Decade: Proof that Unique Institutional Incentives Drive Corporate Governance, 16 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 13, 13 (2007)).
83
Id.
76
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For Japan to successfully transition to a deregulated economy that
relied on free-market mechanisms, citizens needed to trust the law and move
forward without extensive governmental interference. To better serve the
private sector, courts needed better accessibility, greater transparency, and
increased efficiency. They also needed to be more responsive to global
influences, which, in turn, could help Japanese competitiveness on an
international scale. In the past, Japan’s court system was slow in its case
review and private attorneys were scarce.84 The legal system and the courts
needed to adapt, and the size, quality, and breadth of the attorney pool needed
to grow.85
A.

Creation of the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”)

Against this backdrop, the Justice System Reform Council was tasked
with considering the future of law in Japan from the “people’s viewpoint.”86
The JSRC was specifically designed to explore and propose tangible measures
to reform the legal and justice system.87 To achieve this purpose, the Japanese
government invited thirteen distinguished individuals from various political
and economic sectors to join the JSRC to engage in detailed, high-level
discussions about potential civic, legal, and judicial reforms. 88 The invitees
included a former chief justice of the Hiroshima High Court, a former chief
prosecutor of the Nagoya Public Prosecutor’s Office, two members from the
Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and the Japanese
Association of Corporative Executives (the Keizai Doyukai), the former
president of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, the president of the
Federation of Private Universities, a business professor from a private
university, a popular writer, a vice president of the Rengo labor organization,
and the president of the Federation of Homemakers (Shufuren).89 Diversity
was one of the objectives of forming this particular group since different
perspectives allow people to identify a wide range of problems and develop a
variety of remedies.
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Recognizing the potential for a major economic crisis, the JSRC noted
that Japan had embarked on a course of structural reform including “political
reform, administrative reform, [and the] promotion of decentralization and
deregulation to enable Japan to recover its “‘creativity and vitality.’”90 In its
own words, these reforms were intended to further economic development and
ensure that every person would “participate in making a free and fair society”
as a governing subject instead of a governed object.91 Culturally, however,
this concept could be uncomfortable due to the involvement of, and reliance
upon, a government deeply embedded in society through regulation along
with other factors that deterred private citizens from pursuing justice. For
example, consumers were hesitant to expend the time and money necessary to
navigate the obstacles inherent in the judicial process in order to sue big
business.92
1.

Goals of the JSRC

In moving forward, the JSRC, in part, focused on “clarifying the role to
be played by justice in Japanese society in the twenty-first century and
examining and deliberating fundamental measures necessary for” realizing a
justice system that is “easy for the people to utilize,” fosters “participation by
the people in the justice system,” and achieves a strengthened and improved
legal profession and justice system. 93 The JSRC firmly believed that one of
its fundamental tasks should be to distinctly define what must be done to
“transform both the spirit of the law and the rule of law into the flesh and
blood of this country, so that they become the shape of [the] country.”94 This
reflects the transformational goal of reducing the role of government while
empowering the individual. Correspondingly, the group recognized the
importance of a justice system that reinforces popular sovereignty,
democracy, and respect for individuals as recognized in the Constitution of
Japan.95
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During its early stages, the JSRC identified a multitude of potential
improvements for Japan’s justice system. Chief criticisms of the justice
system included the length of both criminal and civil proceedings; the lack of
transparency in the justice system—particularly the closed nature of the
criminal justice system; the inadequacy of legal counsel in terms of quantity
and sophistication; the inability of the courts to adapt to the needs of society
as it becomes more complex; the reality gap between the courts and the
citizenry; as well as the perceived separation between the population and
participants in the court system including judges, attorneys, and court staff.96
Over time, complaints also emerged about the difficulties in using the justice
system.97 Similarly, complaints materialized about the passivity of the
judiciary and an overall inability to serve as a check on administrative
agencies and other branches of government.
In assessing the justice system, the JSRC quickly recognized the need
to reinforce the function of justice in an “increasingly complex and diversified
Japanese society” as well as the necessity of instituting changes to facilitate a
more accessible and user-friendly justice system that “can respond to the
expectations of the people and meet their trust.”98 In terms of access, there
was a push for a legal aid system in a criminal context and a drive to make
civil litigation more affordable. 99 Similarly, there was a push to expand
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.100 Public exposure to the system
was considered vital—not only for the justice system, but also for stimulation
of the private sector.101 Based on the JSRC’s enumerated goals and needed
improvements for the existing system, reformers and JSRC members
approached justice system reform with the mindset that this would be the
“final linchpin” in a series of reforms that would restructure the shape of
Japan—economically and otherwise—and empower it for the future.102
The JSRC’s investigations revealed that improvements to the legal and
court systems could alleviate the business world’s increasing frustration with
inefficiencies and limited legal resources.103 Improvements could also help
address the perceived inefficiencies, slowness, and high costs associated with
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, III.2.
WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 41–42.
Id. at 44.
THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, III.2.
Id.
Id.
WILSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 9.
See THE POINTS AT ISSUE, supra note 51, III.3.

90

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 1

the judicial process.104 Lawsuits were slowed by hearings held sporadically
over the course of months, if not years. Filing fees for litigation were
traditionally high and the number of lawyers with specialization was
comparatively low. Industry had long advocated higher quality legal
assistance in the form of more well-rounded legal professionals. It had also
yearned for a more efficient, reliable, and credible dispute resolution system
as part of facilitating commerce and economic development. Much of the
frustration of the private companies stemmed from cross-border comparisons
with the legal and court systems of Japan’s Western counterparts.
2.

Recommendations of the JSRC and Legislative Change

After sixty meetings and two years of substantive deliberations, the
JSRC released its final report on June 21, 2001, which advocated for wideranging recommendations for reform.105 The suggestions detailed in the
report went far deeper into the legal and court system than even the reformers
had imagined.
The JSRC based its recommendations upon three pillars of fundamental
reform. First, the JSRC felt Japan needed a justice system that is “easier to
use, easier to understand, and more reliable.”106 Second, to achieve these
objectives, Japan should ensure that it has a legal profession “rich both in
quality and quantity.” Third, the country needed to develop a popular base in
which citizens’ trust in the legal system is enhanced through their participation
in legal proceedings and through other measures.107
To effectuate these pillars of reform, the JSRC advocated expanded
public access to the civil litigation system for purposes of achieving civil
justice.108 The civil justice system needed to resolve disputes in a fairer, more
proper, and more prompt manner.109 With respect to criminal justice, the
JSRC believed that the system needed to be equipped to acquire the truth,
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ensure the due process of law, and penalize promptly and properly when
appropriate, while “obtaining the trust of the people.”110
In essence, the reformers saw the judicial system as an engine for
propelling fundamental societal change. It was believed that citizen
participation in the judicial system could, in turn, function as one of the
pistons in the engine of individual empowerment. The JSRC envisioned that
the judicial system and citizen involvement through the lay judge system
would assume an enhanced role in helping shift Japan away from its
traditional model of centralized control and bureaucratic regulation. 111 The
suggested reforms were consistent with the perceived need for Japanese
citizens to not only break away from excessive dependency on the
government, but also to develop greater civic consciousness and become more
actively involved in public affairs. Moreover, the JSRC felt that jury service
would be an effective means of introducing community values and more
common sense into the justice system.112
As a result of the JSRC’s recommendations, the Diet of Japan passed
the Shiho seido kaikaku suishin ho or “Justice System Reform Promotion
Act,”113 facilitating the establishment of the Office for Promotion of Justice
System Reform (“OPJSR”), which would take charge in enacting legislative
reforms along the lines suggested by the JSRC. Over the course of the next
three years, the OPJSR assisted with the passage of twenty-four significant
legal reforms.114
The legal reforms adopted by Japanese legislators extended far beyond
facilitating economic recovery through legal reform. These recommendations
included various civil litigation reforms starting in 2003. These reforms were
designed to accelerate the adjudication of civil cases, 115 expand the
jurisdiction of summary courts,116 improve the Code of Civil Procedure,117
110
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and update the Arbitration Act.118 Reforms to the civil dispute resolution
system also involved the establishment of a new Intellectual Property High
Court, implementation of an amended labor dispute system in which labor
affairs specialists handle adjudication together with the amendments to the
administrative litigation system, and the addition of alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms.119
In 2004, as is common in the initiation phase of planned change,
legislators dove into the criminal justice system, adding new functions and
significantly altering practices. For instance, Japanese policymakers created
a lay judge system requiring citizen participation in serious criminal trials,
enhanced its court-appointed defense counsel system, and implemented a new
pretrial conference system designed to expand discovery as well as improve,
accelerate, and streamline criminal trials.120 All of these reforms to the system
would significantly impact the trial process. In fact, these reforms essentially
required a shift from a fairly docile trial process based on affidavits,
prosecutor dossiers, and other written documentation into a more active trial
proceeding involving more live, in-court testimony by witnesses.
To achieve other parts of its three pillars of reform advocated by the
JSRC, Japan significantly altered the legal system by passing legislation
“aimed at increasing the number of legal professionals and improving the
quality of the attorney pool through the establishment of . . . professional law
schools.”121 Traditionally, the bar passage rate had ranged between two and
three percent.122 An undergraduate or graduate degree in law was not a
prerequisite to sit for the national bar examination, but those who wished to
pass the bar exam focused their attention almost exclusively on the law. 123
For someone seeking to become a lawyer, judge, or prosecutor, private “cram”
schools had been the primary avenue for assistance.124 Again, a major reform
changed the landscape of legal education as seventy-four institutions stepped
118
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up to create “American-style” professional law schools that were separate and
distinct from the nearly one hundred undergraduate and graduate faculties of
law traditionally operated by various Japanese universities.125 Graduates from
these law schools were promised a significantly higher chance to pass the bar
examination in exchange for spending an additional two to three years
studying law at these institutions. The JSRC recommended these new schools
not only to increase the number of bar passers, but also to diversify the legal
profession.126 As a result, professionals law schools sought to admit
applicants from varying backgrounds, different geographic regions, and a
range of academic areas.127
3.

History of Citizen Participation in the Court System

One of the most significant recommendations for reform, if not the most
significant, was the addition of a new function in major crime cases—namely,
so-called jury trials. With the post-war United States occupation of Japan and
American involvement in drafting the Constitution of Japan, many expected
a jury system to return to Japan at the end of the Second World War. Not only
is the right to a jury trial constitutionally guaranteed in the United States
federal and state court systems, but Japan had experimented with jury trials in
certain criminal cases before the war.128 Between 1928 and 1943, Japan
conducted 480 criminal jury trials in major crime cases.129 The original
system failed to reach its full potential due to procedural and practical
imperfections. In 1943, the government officially suspended the Jury Act, 130
due to in large part to the rise of militarism and the government’s need to
control criminal justice leading up to World War II.131
Japan’s original venture into the realm of jury trials ultimately failed
due to lack of trust. Juror selection that was limited to wealthy and educated
males undercut trust in the verdicts. Moreover, the juries themselves had only
125
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limited power. The all-citizen jury of twelve male voters was asked only to
answer questions regarding points of fact, which were ultimately adjudicated
on a majority basis.132 Also, judges were not bound to accept the answers,
and juries were not asked to render a verdict.133 Similarly, the judge could
dismiss the jury at almost any time. There was no right of appeal and
defendants had to bear the jury’s expenses, therefore, the accused were not
inclined to trust juries.134 At the end of the day, almost all criminal defendants
waived their right to a jury trial.135
The continuous suspension of meaningful citizen participation in the
justice system for more than seven decades meant that the Japanese judicial
system was essentially the exclusive domain of legal professionals with
professional judges presiding over all trials at the district court and appellate
levels. The two exceptions to professional dominance included a brief period
of jury trials in Okinawa, 136 and largely unknown Kensatsu Shinsakai, or
Prosecutorial Review Commissions (“PRC”).137
During the period of United States administrative control of the Island
of Okinawa, a number of American-style jury trials occurred in both civil and
criminal cases between 1963 and 1972. 138 Grand jury proceedings were held
in Okinawa, and at least four civil jury trials were instigated by individuals
without significant monetary resources or support against powerful domestic
and foreign interests.139 This was noteworthy given that the American drafters
neither guaranteed nor referenced trial-by-jury in the post-war Constitution of
Japan.
The impact of the PRC had been extremely limited. Consisting of
ordinary citizens, the PRC reviewed the propriety of a prosecutor’s decision
not to prosecute a suspect if a victim or party of interest asked for such a
review.140 If the PRC disagreed with the prosecutor’s decision not to proceed,
it would then issue a recommendation to reconsider its decision not to
132
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prosecute.141 Before the JSRC’s suggested reforms, these recommendations
were not binding, so prosecutors only rarely changed their initial decision
about prosecution.142 However, the adoption of the Lay Judge Act ushered in
a modification to the PRC system.
On a practical level, the saiban’in system was part of a comprehensive
plan to revamp Japan’s justice system. It was essentially the glue that bound
together other criminal justice reforms proposed by the JSRC, including the
expanded power of the PRC. Pursuant to legislation enacted legislation on
May 28, 2004, the PRC recommendations newly became binding on
prosecutors.143 Together with the adoption of the new saiban’in system “for
certain serious cases, under which the general public will participate in
deciding cases together with judges,”144 these monumental changes ushered
in a new era in criminal justice in Japan. While these two reforms in isolation
might not directly impact an individual defendant, they were significant to the
expansion of democratic ideals within Japanese society.
B.

Reception of the Lay Judge System and Related Changes

The initiation of the lay judge system was complicated. Professor
Feeley notes that during the initiation phase because “many changes in the
criminal courts are initiated by outsiders, such as appellate court judges,
legislators, and agency heads,” the original intent of planned changes can be
“neglected or deflected” by institutions close to the courts which must
implement the initiatives.145 Avoidance, evasion, and delay can often
result.146
Lay judge trials were proposed and initiated by outsiders to the criminal
justice system. Moreover, the JSRC combined with Japanese policymakers
imposed the adoption of lay judge trials without significant public discussion
or debate.147 There was no widespread popular movement or consensus to
adopt jury trials, or even to include the citizenry in the judicial process on a
greater scale. At the same time, on a symbolic level, the introduction of lay
judge trials further legitimized democratic engagement. Practically, the
141
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adoption of the lay judge system represented a democratic solution to a largely
opaque criminal justice system and investment of trust in the citizenry. This
raised the question about whether the new saiban’in system would take root,
or if it would simply end as an expensive experiment.
Japanese society has had considerable time to digest and react to the
formal reintroduction of meaningful citizen participation into justice system
after the five-year preparatory period leading up to the first saiban’in trial.
The resulting reactions were mixed. Political reformers, bureaucrats, criminal
attorneys, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, and many scholars were
noticeably excited and optimistic about the prospects underlying increased
citizen participation and its potential impact on the criminal justice system. 148
On the other hand, the majority of Japanese citizens, the courts, the media,
and others were much more critical. In fact, before the first lay judge trial,
the media became notorious for bashing the concept of lay participation in the
criminal justice system.149
Originally, the saiban’in system was viewed, most significantly, with
suspicion by the populous and judiciary, the primary participants in the new
system. Opinion polls consistently confirmed the public’s distrust of the new
system, lack of desire to participate, as well as its angst and fear.150 Skeptics
of the new system contended that Japan’s reforms and sizeable investment in
citizen participation would be futile due to cultural traditions and institutional
impediments.151 Skeptics also predicted that the lay judges would fall short
of expectations due to their lack of legal training, insufficient knowledge, and
susceptibility to emotion and bias. 152
The judiciary adamantly maintained that the lay judge system was not
created due to problems or discontent with the system. It contended that the
jurisprudential approach had been certain and consistent. To a large degree,
this approach had fostered societal stability and engendered trust in the
Japanese judiciary over time. At the same time, the press and critics had
increasingly taken issue with the judiciary and justice system. Although
comparatively low, crime was increasing. In Japan, the government has the
ability to interrogate suspects for extended periods prior to formal arrest with
148
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the intent of eliciting a confession that will facilitate an easier conviction. 153
A string of high-profile wrongful convictions resulting from forced
confessions had raised troubling questions. 154
Concerns about the relative isolation and uniform background of most
professional judges started resonating with the reformers.155 Lawyers,
scholars, and even some former judges, raised additional concerns about the
justice system.156 In the post-war era, Japan’s justice system became known
for the symbiotic power relationship among the courts, the public prosecutor
offices, and the police. Some argued that this resulted in prosecutorial abuses
and Japan’s incredible 99.9% conviction rate.157 Increased scrutiny
highlighted previous criticisms that judges engaged in inadequate factfinding, relied on prosecutors, and failed to operate in a transparent manner.
By shifting to a new system, some of these concerns could be addressed at
least in the cases subject to the new lay judge system.
PROCESS OF PLANNED CHANGE—IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

V.

Japan expended significant energy and resources during the initiation
phase due to the magnitude of the shift to lay judge trials. Similarly, the
implementation stage of this experiment with lay participation was intense as
the country translated the abstract goals delineated by the JSRC into
concrete policies.
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Implementation necessarily “involves staffing, clarifying goals, and
adapting to a new environment.”158 In his book, Professor Feeley notes that
this stage entails the task of translating goals into practical policies. 159
Justice systems are built on certainty, stability, and predictability. If change
is significant, substantial challenges will arise given the disruption of
common routines, interference with established authority, and emergence of
uncertainties.160 Coordination and cooperation are key to achieving success.
In the case of the lay judge system, the change was significant, leaving open
questions about the prospects of coordination, cooperation, and ultimately
success.
A.

Contours of the New Lay Judge System in Japan: Five-Year
Development Period

As Japan decided to significantly alter its court system during its
initiation phase, policymakers needed to decide which alternatives to adopt,
how to finance the programs, and who would oversee the implementation and
operation of the lay judge system during the implementation phase.161 After
some debate about whether to adopt an all-citizen jury model typical in AngloAmerican jurisdictions, such as the United States, or to embrace a mixed
tribunal modeled after Continental-European jurisdictions, Japan embraced
aspects of both models.162 Accordingly, Japan’s saiban’in system is a unique
hybrid, which integrates elements of the common law jury and civil law mixed
jury systems.163 Like common law jury systems including the petite jury in
the United States, lay judges in Japan are randomly selected from voter lists
and participation is limited to a single case.164 Unless excused by the court or
excluded by peremptory challenge, participation is compulsory.165 Likewise,
lay participants stand between the accused and the state rendering a verdict
that can strip away life or liberty from the accused. In other respects, though,
the lay judge system mirrors civil law systems, such as the schoffe lay judge
system in Germany or the echevin system in France, in which citizens
participate in trials as lay judges alongside professional judges.166
158
159
160
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The Lay Judge Act sets forth the parameters of the lay judge system
including the serious crimes subject to this legislation. Under this Act, a
defendant charged with a crime prescribed in the Lay Judge Act cannot waive
or avoid trial by a lay judge panel. 167 In contested cases when the defendant
enters a not guilty plea, the Act requires that six saiban’in or lay judges,
chosen from among eligible voters, join three professional judges for a single
“qualifying” criminal trial to adjudicate guilt or innocence. 168 The nineperson lay judge tribunals also collaborate to determine the sentence of a
convicted defendant.169 By design, the lay judge system limits citizen
participation to involvement in adjudicating certain serious criminal cases. 170
The reasoning underlying this decision largely lies in concerns about the
citizenry’s ability to effectively participate in complex matters and the
importance associated with adjudications involving a person’s liberty.171
In uncontested serious criminal cases, four lay judges and one
professional judge handle the matter.172 Through mutual communication and
the exchange of ideas among the citizen judges and professional judges, the
mixed tribunal is charged with determining guilt and sentencing. 173 Pursuant
to the Lay Judge Act, a guilty verdict requires a majority vote with the
qualification that at least one professional judge and one lay judge must
concur in the majority’s conclusion.174 For an acquittal, five votes are
sufficient even if all of these votes come from the saiban’in or lay judges.175
Procedurally, the prosecutor or defendant may appeal the verdict.176
The selection of the citizen judges begins with each court generating a
prospective lay judge list and summoning lay judges for service from the
list.177 Exemptions from service may be granted based on a personal
relationship with the case or related actor, lay judge service within the past
five years, age over seventy, select occupations in government or law (in
particular, Diet, ministers of state, city council members, lawyers, judges,
167
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prosecutors, police officers, self-defense officers, and certain other
government employees), status as a current student, appointment onto a
prosecutorial review committee, and other individuals who are injured, sick,
or who have unavoidable family or business obligations.178 Citizens are also
exempt if they have not completed compulsory education in Japan, have
committed a crime, or have mental or physical incapacities that would
preclude them from serving. 179
The system is limited in several respects. Although there is certainly
room for expansion, lay judge trials in Japan have been applied only to certain
major crime cases. The lay judges are limited in what they can disclose about
the proceedings. Pursuant to the Lay Judge Act, the saiban’in have a strict
duty of confidentiality, and face severe penalties for disclosing information
about the trial and deliberations both during and after the trial.180
B.

Preparations for the System

Needing the new system to succeed, Japan infused significant thought,
preparation, and expense into the lay judge system’s implementation. This
preparation included both the actual physical facilities (courtroom expansion,
construction of jury deliberation rooms, etc.) and other necessary preparations
(e.g. development of systems, training, education, etc.). Much consideration
was given to the relationship among the professional and citizen judges. The
saiban’in system aimed to achieve fair and just results through professional
judges contributing their legal expertise and the lay judges sharing their
respective societal understanding, personal knowledge, and common sense
experiences. Theoretically, citizen judges would possess the same authority
as the professional judges—both groups would determine facts and engage in
sentencing.181 Through the chief judge, lay judges would even have the ability
to question witnesses.182 However, legal and procedural matters are reserved
for professionals due to their specialized training. 183
To effectively implement this new system, education was key.
Professional judges required training on how to officiate over the trials while
affording sufficient deference to the citizen participants. Prosecutors and
178
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criminal defense attorneys had never before addressed any type of jury. Due
to the significant differences between a traditional Japanese court proceeding
and saiban’in trials, training was necessary for all lawyers participating in the
saiban’in proceedings. Both the Prosecutors Office and Japan Federation of
Bar Associations (“JFBA”) constructed training programs, hosted mock trials,
and held educational events. Drawing from my own experiences as a trial
attorney and law professor, I personally had the opportunity of assisting the
JFBA with its training programs and even spearheaded several training events
both before and after the first saiban’in trial. In essence, this training was
intended to help defense counsel and prosecutors make trials quicker and
easier to understand for the lay judges.
In addition to training lawyers and judges, it was necessary to educate
the general public about the new system. Before the first lay judge trial, the
Japanese government (including the courts and prosecutors), together with the
JFBA and other organizations, “spent well over USD $50 million promoting
the new jury-like system to the public through billboards, print
advertisements, television programs, Japanese manga (cartoons), Japanese
anime (animations), a mascot, mock trials, symposiums, internet videos, and
other means.”184 Mass media coverage of mock trials, symposiums, and any
other developments related to the new system were unparalleled. 185 Leading
up to the first saiban’in trial in 2009, it seemed that there was information
regarding the new system wherever one turned.
Once the system had officially kicked off, media coverage about the
saiban’in system started shifting from critical to quite positive. 186 With a
noticeable shift in the tone of press coverage, the opportunity for education
and positive reinforcement through the mass media expanded. Also, public
education efforts have persisted. The Supreme Court, Prosecutors Office, and
JFBA have produced educational materials and hold related events.187 Books,
television shows, manga, and even video games centering on the saiban’in
system have emerged.188 One prime example of efforts to bring the justice
184
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system to the citizenry is the computer game developed by the Osaka Bar
Association that gives players a “taste of what they may experience as a
citizen judge.”189 Efforts like this are helpful given that candidates for lay
judge service likely benefit from a greater awareness of legal procedures.
PROCESS OF PLANNED CHANGE—ROUTINIZATION & EVALUATION
PHASES

VI.

An expansive body of theoretical literature has addressed the key
components that determine the likelihood of success of a certain legal
initiative.190 In the Feeley formula, the fourth phase of planned change relates
to the routinization of a new program and the commitment by an institution
to the program both financially and logistically. 191 The fifth and final phase
of the formula is related to the fourth phase, and therefore it is appropriate to
address these together. The fifth phase involves an evaluation or assessment
of the prospects of success for a legal reform, and more specifically whether
the reform will work on a long-term basis once it is routine. In the words of
Professor Feeley, “new programs are usually assessed during their
experimental (the first three) stages rather than their routine periods (the
fourth stage) . . . it tells us next to nothing about whether it will work.”192
Whether an innovation is successful depends on “how it performs under
this routine rather than under its initial conditions.”193 What possibly succeeds
during the “exciting new experiment” period, may struggle once the
innovative change has become the norm and the “halo” has worn off.194 If,
for instance, the process of policy making and implementation is so strongly
controlled by the players in the status quo from the very beginning, such that
only those reforms which are acceptable to the players is likely to be
introduced or succeed, and if the implementation is tightly and carefully
managed by the status quo, then the introduced reform will likely become
routinized with results that the status quo can be regarded as a success. If the
status quo does not agree with the changes, however, then the success of the
reform as originally intended may be endangered.
189
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A prime illustration of the status quo disagreeing fundamentally with
one of the Japan’s recent transformative changes is the experiment with new
professional law schools in Japan. This major reform was enthusiastically
embraced by many (including over seventy universities that created new law
schools) and initially experienced success in drawing a wide-array of students
and attracting legal talent into the classroom. However, the new law schools
have quickly backslid due to governmental interference, lower than advertised
bar pass rates, reduced governmental funding, and opposition from within the
legal profession to increased attorney numbers and perceived lower quality
law graduates.195 Unfortunately, the existence of many of these new law
schools will likely be short lived due to failed government promises and other
countervailing forces.196 In terms of routinization, the question is whether the
saiban’in system will follow the path of Japan’s ongoing experiment with law
schools, or if the routinization of the system will follow a different path.
A.

Performance and Impact of the Lay Judge System

Although the saiban’in system is not perfect and could benefit from
some tweaking, it has succeeded on many levels since its inception in 2009.
Fundamentally, the government has consistently endorsed the lay judge
system. Administratively, court planners have been sensitive to minimizing
inconveniences to the citizenry. 197 Legally, the Supreme Court of Japan
rebuked constitutional challenges to citizen participation in the justice system
and validated the new system. 198 Operationally, professional judges on the
trial court level have been cooperative and engaged. Though not absolute, the
appellate courts have typically been careful to protect lay judge verdicts
despite a “prosecutor’s inclination to appeal unsuccessful cases.”199 In
addition, many have been encouraged by the new system’s
accomplishments.200
In terms of satisfying the JSRC’s original goals and recommendations,
the lay judge system has demonstrated substantial promise in its formative
195
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years of its existence. The goal of bringing the justice system closer to the
citizenry has been accomplished. Many of the fears and doubts expressed
previously by critics have not materialized. Many individuals have “greater
confidence in the concept of public governance.”201 Participatory governance
has demonstrated that the law and justice system can be accessible to ordinary
citizens. It showed that the citizenry is adequately educated to comprehend
the law as it governs society. The public has been able to explore and
experience the legal system firsthand, thereby increasing transparency. In
turn, this transparency has focused the eyes of society on some of the
perceived weaknesses of the justice system.
In terms of serious crime trials, the lay judge system has functioned
quite well in terms of direct benefits. At the same time, the biggest successes
can be attributed to the indirect benefits that have flowed from this
monumental change to the criminal justice system. In essence, the adoption
of the saiban’in system was as the vehicle to effectuate a plethora of other
reforms related to the justice system.
1.

Success During the Initial Years—the “Halo” Period

The most impactful direct benefit of the lay judge system during its first
five years or the “halo” period is likely educational. The citizenry has a
greater understanding of the justice system based on media coverage of, or
actual participation in, the criminal trial process. Media coverage of the
criminal justice system since the adoption of lay judge trials has reached an
unprecedented level. Press and public interest in lay judge trials was rampant
during the first five years of the new system, and the interest remains to this
day.
Individuals who have had a chance to participate first-hand have gained
a greater understanding of the criminal justice system. “Between May 2009
and February 2014, the names of 1,737,106 citizens appeared on the lay judge
rolls. Of these, a total 48,345 citizens served either as lay judges (36,027
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people) or alternate lay judges (12,318 people).”202 By the end of 2016,
54,964 citizens had served as lay judges.203
Although the system is still in its infancy, this direct exposure has
generated an increasing amount of data facilitating governmental reports
about cases and official surveys of lay judges. Scholarly analysis is
widespread, and the news media has developed a pattern of diligently tracking
and reporting the progress of the system. Lay judges have also assisted, albeit
in a limited capacity, in getting the word out. Despite a strict confidentiality
requirement mandating that lay judges remain silent with respect to their
deliberations or otherwise face a fine and/or imprisonment, a practice has
arisen for lay judges to give press conferences about their experiences.204 At
the press conferences, lay judges voluntarily discuss their reactions to what
they heard and discuss their general experiences. Despite the limitations on
what a lay judge can say, the press continues to cover their reactions, thereby
helping to educate the populace.205 Collectively, the flow of information has
increased substantially thereby enriching the public’s awareness of the justice
system and promoting an in-depth discussion about critical social issues
related to the criminal justice system. This has solidified the democratic
processes promoted by citizen participation in government and instilled a
heightened trust in the truth-finding process and due process of law.
The swift acceptance of public involvement in the justice system has
been encouraging. Japan made a major commitment to the lay judge system
by providing funding and a solid base of operations from the start.206 This
commitment did not change during the first five years of the saiban’in system.
Accordingly, without any noticeable major hiccups, citizen participation in
serious crime trials quickly became integrated into the Japanese criminal
justice system. Lay judges willingly deliberated alongside professional
judges making collective decisions, reaching verdicts, and issuing sentences.
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Through February 2014, [lay] judges had been involved in 7,868
serious criminal cases and rendered verdicts in 6,392 of them.
The most common type of cases [were] robbery resulting in
bodily injury (1,883 cases) and murder (1,644 cases). Among
the verdicts rendered, lay judge tribunals found a total of 6,222
defendants guilty (among which 21 people were sentenced to
death)[,] . . . found 33 defendants not guilty, [and] the remainder
of the cases were transferred to family court, otherwise
resolved[,] or dismissed. Approximately 35[%] of the verdicts
[were] appealed.207
The system itself has benefited from citizen involvement. Lay judges
have approached their task with much seriousness. They have confronted
each trial with diligence and sincerity. 208 This honest approach has led to
“clear signs [that] careful attention” is being applied to deliberations, “the
presumption of innocence, and reasonable doubt standards.”209 Achieving the
presumption of innocence in the Japanese criminal system is a giant leap
forward.
There are also concrete indications that citizen service in the courtroom
enhances trust in the criminal justice system. Almost uniformly, Japanese
citizens have spurned the idea of lay judge service when questioned by
pollsters. 210 Almost always, this sentiment disappears once a citizen has
served alongside professional judges in a saiban’in trial. In fact, citizens
serving as lay judges have uniformly praised their experience. In surveys
regularly conducted by the Supreme Court every year, over ninety percent of
lay judges characterize their actual courtroom experience as positive or
extremely positive during the first five years of the new system. 211 This
outcome has continued. In fact, the Supreme Court survey conducted in 2016
showed that among those citizens who did not want to participate in a lay
judge trial before serving, their post-trial sentiment had shifted
207
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considerably.212 Among this group, 56.8% of the lay judges felt that it was an
“extremely good” experience, 38.5% felt it was a “good” experience, 2.1%
felt that it wasn’t the best experience, 0.8% felt that it was a bad experience,
0.5% didn’t have any feelings about the experience, and 0.8% did not respond
to the question.213
Citizen judges have remarked that their civic service enabled them to
learn much, seriously reflect on important issues facing Japanese society, and
even educate others.214 Consistent with the objectives underlying the new
system, the educational value of lay judge participation has been clear. Some
of the feedback has included how the lay judge experience has led to a greater
understanding of the court system and its participants.215 Others have
appreciated the opportunity to engage with other members of the community
for a common purpose.216 Overall, all stakeholders in the process have
benefitted from the integration of common sense and differing perspectives
into the trial process.
2.

Beyond the First Five Years—Direct Impact on Citizenry
and Outcomes

Notwithstanding the positive hype, press coverage, and circumstances
underlying this exciting new experiment, the saiban’in system’s direct impact
is hindered by its limited scope. Only three percent of all criminal cases are
heard by lay judges.217 Saiban’in do not participate in civil or administrative
litigation. This limited scope hinders more citizens from directly interacting
with the justice system. Japan has a unique opportunity to advance
participatory democracy through expansion of its lay judge system and with
its initial successes has demonstrated how this is possible.
Given the momentum of its new lay judge system, now is a prime time
for Japan to consider expanding citizen participation into the civil justice
realm.218 Expanding the scope of citizen involvement in the justice system
212
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would be consistent with the goals set forth by the JSRC. 219 In terms of an
expanded scope, Japan could target lawsuits that have a major societal impact.
The citizenry would likely welcome the opportunity to participate in
administrative litigation or impactful cases involving environmental disasters,
mass torts, nuisance, breach of privacy, the unauthorized disclosure of
personally identifiable data, professional negligence resulting in injury or
death, and other similar claims.
Japan is ready for expanded citizen engagement. The lay judge system
has been admittedly successful in its implementation. From an educational
standpoint, the public has been inundated with information about jury service
over the past decade so they should be primed for further participation.
Logistically, the country has made preparations to accommodate juries in its
courtroom facilities. Through expansion, Japan can obtain many of the same
benefits on the civil side that have been experienced in a criminal context.
Not only will more citizens be directly exposed to the justice system, but they
can also infuse common sense and societal values into the system. Moreover,
if citizen participation was introduced into the civil justice system, even on a
limited basis, it could bring society even closer to self-governance while
simultaneously strengthening the democratic foundations of society,
promoting justice, and helping ensure equitable results in individual cases
even further. It could also help quell increasing public frustration with
governmental inaction. Accountability in the public and private sectors could
increase thereby diminishing problematic conduct. This is the next logical
step for Japan in continuing to advance the goals underlying its legal reforms.
In terms of direct impact on the criminal justice system, the trial
outcomes have essentially remained the same. In saiban’in cases, the
conviction rate has continued to hover around Japan’s notoriously high
conviction rate of 99.9% during the first eight years of its existence. 220 To the
chagrin of criminal defense attorneys and certain observers, this outcome has
been disappointing. However, it might be argued that the circumstances have
changed because prosecutors have become even more cautious and selective
in the number of cases brought to trial.
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Sentences by the saiban’in tribunals have been largely equivalent to
previous cases tried exclusively by professional judges. 221 Sentences in
serious sex crimes have, however, been harsher.222 The consistency in
sentencing has resulted from fairly strict controls by the status quo. More
specifically, the courts have insisted on the use of a national sentencing
database, and the Supreme Court has given specific directions.223 Also, the
first lay judge case overturned by the Supreme Court involved the conviction
of parents for child abuse causing bodily injury resulting in death. 224 In this
case, the lay judge panel imposed a term of imprisonment longer than that
requested by the prosecutor.225 The panel justified its sentence based on the
history of child abuse, attitude of the defendants in shifting the blame, and the
lack of similar cases in the national sentencing database.226 Social attitudes
further justified the harsher sentence.227 The Supreme Court acknowledged
that the lay judge system was introduced to better reflect the views of
“common people” with respect to the commission of crimes such that different
sentences might be fully expected, and that the panel must fully examine and
consider the sentencing standards of prior cases.228 In this case, the Supreme
Court concluded that the panel failed to show the basis for more severe
sentencing.229
Although there is relative uniformity in sentencing, different
perspectives have been incorporated into the trial process. Judges have
appreciated citizen input and worked together with the lay judges without
substantial objections or alarm.230 In fact, citizen participation in the lay judge
system has legitimized governmental action and verdicts. The use of lay judge
trials has resulted in a renewed emphasis on central tenets of justice including
fairness, accuracy, and the presumption of justness. With the outside spotlight
on the professional judges both in the courtroom and deliberation room, indepth analysis and extra judicial care are natural consequences. The inclusion
221
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of individuals from varied backgrounds into lay judge tribunals better reflects
the composition of society and goes beyond the diversity of the elite who tend
to make up the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
3.

Beyond the First Five Years—Indirect Impact of Change

Although the lay judge system’s direct impact on the outcomes of a
comparatively few number of individual criminal trials has been relatively
minimal, the real value of this major court reform has been indirect, or at least,
specifically designed to complement a transformed criminal justice system.
These “indirect” benefits include improvements to court procedures,
transparency, better efficiency, and attention by the courts to evidence, facts,
and justice.
The saiban’in system stimulated reforms in various aspects of the
criminal pretrial process.231 Reform was necessary for the system to succeed.
These reforms included the adoption of pretrial coordination procedures, the
increased use of recordings during interrogations, expanded discovery rights
for defendants, and relaxed bail reform.232 It also led to the creation of a legal
aid program to provide counsel for indigent suspects.233
The impact of procedural changes associated with the lay judge system
have been striking. Before inception of the lay judge system in 2009, all
criminal trials were discontinuous proceedings held on random days over the
course of months (if not years) in which professional judges simultaneously
considered the facts, guilt, and sentencing. Now, lay judge trials are
concentrated and occur on consecutive days.234 After the consolidation of the
trial process, the saiban’in trial hearings took an average of 5.6 consecutive
days in 2016.235 The deliberations took an average 10.4 hours in 2016. 236
To increase efficiency and facilitate a speedy trial on consecutive days,
“[t]he Lay Judge Act stipulates that all cases subject to lay judge trials shall
be subject to a mandatory pretrial process, known as kouhanmae seiri
tetsuzuki or pretrial conference procedures, that must occur before the start of
231
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233
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trial.”237 Courts now hold pretrial meetings to identify contested issues,
outline a concrete plan for trial, and facilitate greater exchange of evidentiary
material in advance of trial.238 In the pre-saiban’in trial era, prosecutors only
needed to disclose materials that they planned on introducing at trial. 239
Contradictory statements or harmful materials often never came forth. At
least to some degree, this has changed. To a large degree, the pretrial
proceedings have helped increase transparency and satisfy the constitutional
promise of the right to a speedy trial. These proceedings have helped increase
efficiency and minimize the duration of lay judge trials. 240 Although not
compulsory in criminal cases that do not qualify for saiban’in treatment, the
courts’ use of this procedure has also expanded to non-saiban’in cases in
which the accused pleads not guilty and the parties disagree regarding the
evidence to be introduced at trial.241
Another procedural point of impact has been an emphasis on orality and
directness, as seen in an increased importance placed on live witnesses and
oral testimony.242 Under the previous system, the professional judge panels
“relied heavily on written materials [and evidence], including the prosecutor’s
investigation dossier.”243 The prosecution would meticulously develop its
dossier and structure it to best realize a conviction.244 Over defense counsel’s
vigorous objections, “judges generally accepted the dossier into evidence with
little [or no] reservation.”245 With the adoption of lay judge trials, the tribunals
rely comparatively less on prosecutorial dossiers, and much more on live
witness testimony. Hearings on consecutive days now enable the professional
and lay judges to analyze live testimony and written evidence in a cohesive
fashion. Notwithstanding the notable improvements, professional judges
have sometimes reverted to their old habits of allowing prosecutors to read
investigative materials and confessionary statements aloud in court instead of
requiring the direct questioning of witnesses, investigators, and other relevant
individuals.
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Another procedural benefit realized through citizen participation has
been the increased emphasis on communication. Because ordinary citizens
are now involved in the adjudication process, the attorneys and professional
judges have strived to communicate with citizen jurors in understandable
terms by using plain language throughout the proceedings. This has been an
ongoing emphasis associated with the saiban’in system. In fact, special
training sessions on lay judge communication continue to be held for criminal
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges.
The newfound transparency in the criminal justice system has opened
the door to both scrutinizing the flaws in the judicial process and seeking
solutions for such flaws. With increased attention, society has become aware
of important issues such as forced confessions and capital punishment. This
has already resulted in changes in practice, procedure, and the law.
Since the inception of lay judge trials, intense scrutiny has been placed
on forced confessions and flaws in the interrogation process. In 2016, the Diet
finally passed a law requiring the government to take measures within three
years to record, in its entirety, the interrogation process of any defendant who
is subject to a saiban’in trial or any case being investigated by a special
prosecutor squad.246 To date, investigators record interrogations at their own
discretion or not at all.247 In response to calls for reform in preparation for lay
judge trials, Japanese police only started recording interrogations in 2008.248
By 2015, the police still recorded less than fifty percent of interrogations in
lay judge cases, and recording was often selective. 249 This will change
pursuant to this new legislation. Now, police must record all interrogations
conducted during investigations of alleged crimes to qualify for a lay judge
trial.250 This requirement will only apply to crime cases subject to the Lay
Judge Act, illustrating how the lay judge system has indirectly impacted the
greater legal system.251
Since the inception of lay judge trials, all murder defendants have been
tried by mixed tribunals. This is a major difference from past practice in
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which three professional judges tried everyone accused of murder.252 Along
these lines, there has been a renewed discussion about capital punishment in
Japan.253 Often shrouded in secrecy, public involvement in adjudicating
crimes that qualify for the death penalty has added another dimension to
public scrutiny and discourse.254 As lay judge trials have resulted in death
sentences, there have been renewed calls from the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations, certain segments, and even former lay judges to reconsider and
even abolish the death penalty.255
4.

Working on the Imperfections and Challenges

Notwithstanding the “excitement and fanfare” of this new experiment,
there is still room for improvement.256 During the initial phases of the routine
period, Japan continuously evaluated the saiban’in system. The enabling
legislation of the new system called for a comprehensive evaluation in 2012—
only three years into the new system’s existence. Accordingly, the General
Secretariat of the Supreme Court issued its fifty-page three-year evaluation in
December 2012.257 Additionally, Japan continues to evaluate of the saiban’in
system. The Supreme Court’s efforts constantly monitor the challenges and
successes of the system through research, polling of citizen judges, and other
initiatives.258
In its evaluative report, the Supreme Court concluded that the new
system was functioning comparatively well. 259 The rollout had been
successful, the new system was stable, and the outcomes of the new system
were consistent with the outcomes of the previous criminal justice system. 260
There was no suggestion that the new system needed to be subject to a major
reconstruction or even scaled back. The tone of the report was positive, and
in fact seemed to conclude that many of the concerns that existed before the
roll-out of the system were not as serious as originally feared. The reasons
252
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underlying the initial success stemmed largely from the value provided to the
system by citizen participation. The lay judges engaged enthusiastically
during the trial process in terms of their desire to understand, willingness to
work hard, and eagerness to speak up during the deliberations.261 In fact, the
Supreme Court noted that more than ninety-five percent of the lay judges felt
that participation on a mixed jury was a valuable experience.262
At the same time, the Supreme Court’s three-year evaluation noted a
broad array of concerns and issues that needed to be addressed.263 There were
growing concerns about an increasing number of lay judges either seeking
exemption or excusal from jury service, or rather simply more citizens who
were failing to show up for service despite receiving a summons. 264 As
detailed below, this challenge has progressively grown over the past eight
years. During the first few years of the system, the populous was
comparatively diligent in their responsiveness to calls to serve as a saiban’in.
Subsequently though, citizen participation has trended in a downward fashion.
In 2016, according to the Supreme Court of Japan, the proportion of those
who refused to serve rose to nearly sixty-five percent.265 This is a twelve
percent decrease in participation compared to when the lay judge system
officially started in 2009.266
One of the main reasons cited for refusing to serve is a proliferation of
non-traditional employment in Japan.267 Such employment arrangements
make it difficult to take time off of work. Another reason is the increasing
length of trials.268 Although most lay judge trials finish within a week, this
can feel like an inordinate amount of time away from work in light of the
country’s work culture.269 Even more significantly, longer and more complex
trials can provide individual challenges and also draw negative press. In 2017,
the highly publicized and complex trial of Chisako Kakehi was scheduled to
be lengthy. Ms. Kakehi was charged with the murder or attempted murder of
four men with whom she had engaged in a relationship—marital or others.
Her trial was scheduled to span 135 days and include fifty hearings and more
261
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than fifty witnesses.270 To fill the citizen lay judge spots, the district court
summoned 920 individuals for prospective service.271 More than eighty
percent of those summoned refused to serve.272
At the same time, courts have likely compounded the problem of
saiban’in service by permitting prospective lay judges to decline.273 While
such leniency may be the result of courts fearing the consequences of a
citizenry that feels it is forced to serve, the unwillingness to insist on
participation could lead to long-term problems with the system. This is
particularly likely given that opinion polls demonstrate acceptance of the
system increases significantly when a person serves as a lay judge. 274
Other topics addressed in the Supreme Court’s evaluative report in
2012 focused largely upon the burdens on lay judges, such as concerns about
increasingly longer trials, the strict confidentiality obligation, the mental toll
exacted by jury service, and accommodations.275 It also noted potential
procedural issues involving opening arguments, investigation of evidence,
handling of deliberations, structure of judgments, cases involving the death
penalty, appeals, and other matters.276 As the system becomes even more
routine, the government’s mission is tackling these challenges and improving
the system.
Aside from the Supreme Court’s report, observers have focused on a
host of areas for potential improvement. To further enhance participatory
democracy and the educational benefits of citizen engagement, Japan might
consider relaxing the strict lifetime confidentiality obligations imposed on the
lay judges to facilitate transparency and greater accessibility. Saiban’in are
subject to significant fines or imprisonment for leaking any confidential
information learned during jury service, any part of the lay judge panel’s
deliberations, opinions or identities of other lay judge members, or personal
opinions about the panel’s findings or weight that should have been attributed
to the evidence.277 Prohibiting citizen jurors from communicating their trial
experience with others can be harmful to their health, particularly in serious
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criminal trials. Japan has attempted to combat this by offering free
counseling, a hotline, and other means of enhancing psychological
assistance.278 Just as significantly, for the saiban’in system to have the
maximum impact, former lay judges need to talk about their experiences
freely.279 Strict confidentiality standards reduce the multiplier effect that
might be expected from conversations with family members, friends,
workplace colleagues and others. Absent relaxed standards, the flow of
information and positive effects of transparent civic service are hindered. 280
With respect to evidentiary matters, the availability of materials to the
defense has increased significantly, particularly in comparison with the presaiban’in system era.281 Despite improved transparency, prosecutors can still
refrain from producing potentially harmful evidence.
The pretrial
proceedings tend to inhibit lay judges from seeing and considering all relevant
materials because professional judges can exclude materials in an effort to
streamline actual trial hearings.282 For purposes of obtaining justice and
providing the lay judges with all relevant information, greater disclosure is
desirable. Although expediency can decrease the burden on the lay judges,
there should be no substitute for a defendant’s right to a fair and complete trial
in the name of expediency.
Another concern is whether procedural defects or obstacles caused by
compromises reached in the creation of the system will inhibit systematic
success. Professor Feeley emphasized such a concern in his work.283 In
essence, the development of the lay judge system was a compromise in terms
of its structure due in large part to objections from the status quo. Although
some would have preferred an all-citizen jury, Japan opted for a mixed
tribunal system whereby three professional judges have the opportunity to
oversee and work directly with six citizen judges. Naturally, these
experienced adjudicators have the unfettered ability to control interpretations
of evidence behind closed doors. Holding firm to the viewpoint that the
existing system was sufficient, there was little impetus for change beyond
acknowledging that educating people through participation would have
benefits. In the eyes of the judiciary, meaningful public input into the verdict
278
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and sentencing was not necessarily the desired goal. Along these same lines,
it is noteworthy that certain verdicts are not possible without at least one
professional judge joining the lay judges.
Since the first lay judge trial in 2009, observers have expressed
concerns related to lay judges including the length of the trials, financial losses
due to missed work, and psychological harms from being exposed to
gruesome evidence.284 Without question, it is important to reduce the burden
on the citizenry in order to generate support and buy-in for the new system.
However, lay judge service should not be discounted such that procedure
overtakes substance. For citizens adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a
fellow citizen, the main priority should obtaining justice efficiently. When
dealing with the life and liberty of the accused, the system must provide every
opportunity for due process. Additionally, participatory democracy requires
active engagement and sacrifice. A few days of lay judge service for the
betterment of society should be viewed as a privilege and civic duty. Again,
lay judge surveys demonstrate citizens share this view once they have served.
Finally, in considering the search for truth and due process, the structure
of the current system can be viewed as a weakness. Some have voiced
significant worries about the potential for tainting a verdict by not bifurcating
the trial process so that sentencing is done only after a guilty verdict has been
reached.285 Splitting the verdict stage from the sentencing stage avoids
potential prejudice to the determination of guilt especially where evidence
relevant only to sentencing is inflammatory. Evidence inapplicable to a
determination of guilt includes evidence of prior crimes or victim impact
statements. It also includes trial participation by victims or victim
representatives, which is now allowed in saiban’in trials pursuant to the wave
of court system reforms undertaken by Japan.286 Although bifurcation is often
discussed in the context of concern about citizen jurors’ inability to mentally
separate the prejudicial impact of previous crimes or impassionate pleas from
victims, the lack of separation potentially impacts professional judges as well.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The saiban’in system has taken a firm hold in Japanese society and has
benefitted both individuals and society alike. Going forward, the system holds
great promise of future success as well. Judicial reform and citizen
involvement in government have been viewed as a means of spurring private
sector economic activity by reducing governmental influence and power.
Whether these goals will be fully realized remains to be seen.
In the context of the Feeley formula, it is necessary to continue
evaluating the sustained prospects for success and monitor the potential
pitfalls that might stand in the way of the saiban’in system. Centralized
control of the new system and well-defined duties of actors could hinder the
continuing development of this major reform if its purposes are neglected or
forgotten.287 Moreover, because the government has continued to emphasize
efficiency, another concern is whether all of the intended effects and benefits
of the new system will be realized. 288
At the same time, the likelihood of success has been bolstered by the
large and sustained investment made in the new system. This includes
structural facilities, operating budgets, and commitment. The saiban’in
system also benefits from the efforts of highly trained professionals within the
court system who oversee the system and perform complex tasks. The rollout
and operation of the system has been surprisingly smooth. Although the
opportunity exists for expansion of the system, the comparatively small
number of saiban’in trials to date has also likely contributed to the sustained
success of the system given that these professionals have been able focus on
any issues or challenges that might arise.
Building on the momentum of the lay judge system, Japan should
seriously consider expanding citizen participation into the legal decisionmaking process in civil trials. Through expansion, Japan can obtain many of
the same benefits on the civil side that have been experienced in a criminal
context. Also, not only can more citizens be directly exposed to the court
system, but they can also infuse common sense and societal values into the
system. This is the next logical step for Japan in continuing to advance the
goals underlying its legal reforms.
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